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Introduction

The history of the People’s Republic of China’s foreign policy has been one of constant
change, but it has also been one of continuity. This balance between continuity and change if
especially apparent in regards to its relationship with Africa; the continent thereby provides an
excellent setting to analyze these various changes and constants.

Established on October 1",

1949, the PRC did not start to develop a relationship with African nations until the late 1950s
when African nations gradually became free from the rule and oppression of their colonial
masters.

By 1960, however, three-quarters of Africa’s countries had gained independence, and

Sino-A frican relations began.
My analysis will therefore attempt to compare and contrast the motivational forces behind
China’s foreign policy on the African continent at their beginning during the 1960s with those at
work today during the first decade of the twenty-first century. These motivational forces are
three-fold; they involve diplomatic, ideological, and economic interests.
The driving motivational force behind China’s foreign policy during the 1960s was
diplomacy, and will serve as the focus for my first chapter. China’s main goal during the 1960s
was to attain international recognition for the legitimacy of its communist government over that
of the Nationalist government.

To this end, the PRC needed to gain enough support to overthrow

and replace Taiwan’s Nationalist Government as one of the five permanent members on the
United Nation’s Security Council.
Diplomacy is defined here as the practice of conducting negotiations between nations
without arousing hostility, and served as the necessary driving force in the PRC’s strategy to
achieve legitimacy for its sovereignty in the eyes of the world.

In other words, this battle for

legitimacy is not one that China could win by force, a fact recognized by the Chinese leadership

and evidenced through their choice to conduct diplomacy rather than warfare.

This leads me to

formulate my first hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1: Diplomacy was the driving motivational force for China’s foreign
policy during the 1960s.
Contrasting with the 1960s, diplomacy no longer seems to be the driving motivational
force for China’s foreign policy with Africa today.

Although China’s diplomatic goals have

broadened since the 1960s, China’s foreign policy in terms of diplomacy seems to have adopted
the role of serving as a tool to further China’s new primary motivational force: economic
interests.

Hypothesis 2: Diplomacy is no longer the driving motivational force for China’s
foreign policy.
Whereas China’s diplomatic motivations during the 1960s were formed to serve the single
goal of achieving international legitimacy for the nation’s communist government, those
motivations now extend to a wide variety of goals, most of which are led by economic aspirations
and a desire to consolidate rather than establish power and legitimacy.

Along with a drastic

change in China’s diplomatic goals within its foreign policy, China’s methods for implementing
these goals have also changed, constantly adapting to evolving domestic ideological and
economic factors.
Hypothesis 3: The evolution of the PRC’s diplomatic motivations is defined by
change rather than continuity.
The focus of my second chapter relates to the second motivational force behind China’s

foreign policy in Africa: ideological interests. Whereas China’s diplomatic motivations as well
as the conclusions I derived from their analysis are quite straightforward and should provoke no

great opposition, the question of China’s ideology, defined here as a system of thoughts that
drives the decision-making process, is much more complex.
It is important, for the purpose of this chapter, to differentiate between China’s domestic
ideology and its foreign ideology.

The thought process that drove China’s domestic ideology

during the 1960s, though it had started to stray from pure Marxism-Leninism as dictated by the
Soviet Union, was primarily communist in nature. Political scientists tend to apply this ideology
to China’s foreign policy too, thereby making the simple assumption that domestic ideology acts
as the driving force for foreign policy. In this sense, it follows that China’s ideological
motivations in Africa are based on a desire for communist expansion.

I completely disagree with

the idea that China’s foreign policy’s main ideological goal was to expand communism and
become the world’s primary communist leader, and have therefore decided to analyze China’s
foreign policy independently from its domestic environment.

Although China’s domestic

ideological motivations were primarily dogmatic in nature, I believe that China’s foreign policy
did not reflect those motivations, and were essentially pragmatic in nature.

This leads me to

formulating my fourth hypothesis:
Hypothesis 4: China’s ideological motivations in Africa during the 1960s were
pragmatic rather than dogmatic.

The pragmatic nature of China’s ideological involvement on the African continent has
continued into these early years of the twenty-first century, and save a few rhetorical differences,
remains quite similar to that observed during the 1960s.

The real ideological change has

occurred on a domestic level with the implementation of Deng Xiaoping’s Opening Up reforms
in the 1980s, representing a stray from “Mao Zedong Thought” and growing pragmatism on a
domestic level.

My fifth hypothesis about China’s foreign policy is therefore:

Hypothesis 5: China’s current ideological motivations in Africa are pragmatic in
nature.

Hypotheses 4 and 5 are almost identical, exemplifying the continuous rather than

changing nature of China’s ideological motivations in Africa throughout the PRC’s history.
Although some change is inevitable, those changes present in China’s ideological motivations are
superficial and mostly limited to slight rhetorical differences.
Hypothesis 6: The nature of China’s current ideological motivations in Africa is
continuous with the nature of those observed during the 1960s.

The focus of my third chapter involves China’s economic interests. Contrary to China’s
ideological motivations, China’s economic interests in Africa directly reflect the nation’s
domestic economic conditions.

During the 1960s China’s level of economic development placed

it among the other poorly developed nations of the “Third World,” preventing it from developing
significant trade relations and being competitive on the international market.
Hypothesis 7: During the 1960s China’s economic motivations on the African
continent reflected the country’s domestic conditions.

The change in China’s domestic economic conditions as a result of Deng Xiaoping’s
Opening Up reforms fundamentally shifted the focus of China’s foreign policy with Africa, and
economic interests have now become a fundamental part of Sino-African relations.

Although

diplomatic and ideological motivations still play an important role in shaping China’s foreign
policy, economic forces have now replaced diplomatic motivations as the new driving
motivational force for China’s foreign policy in Africa.

Hypothesis 8: Economic interests have now replaced diplomatic motivations as
China’s foreign policy’s primary motivational force in Africa.

When comparing and contrasting China’s foreign policy’s motivational forces in the
1960s with those operating today, I have found that diplomatic motivations have been
fundamentally defined by change, ideological motivations have predominantly reflected a trend
of continuity, but China’s economic interests cannot be so easily categorized as they contain
elements of both continuity and change. On one hand China’s economic interests continue to be
a reflection of and dependent on the nation’s domestic conditions, while on the other hand, they

have come to the forefront and now act as the driving force that influences and dictates all other
elements of the nation’s foreign policy.

This leads me to formulating this paper’s final

hypothesis about China’s foreign policy in Africa:
Hypothesis 9: China’s economic interests in Africa today show both change and
continuity in comparison with those of the 1960s.

Through these nine hypotheses I hope to shed some light on the motivational forces that

drive China’s foreign policy on the African continent.

Chapter I: China’s Diplomatic Motivations
An Introduction

The dynamics of China’s diplomatic involvement on the African continent have
undergone vast changes over the past fifty years. First, the nature of China’s diplomatic goals
has changed; during the 1960s, China’s main goal was to attain international recognition for the
legitimacy of its communist government over that of the Nationalist government; today, the
setting for China’s diplomatic relations in Africa has been altered by several historical
developments, the most important of which is that the People’s Republic of China won the fight

for international recognition against Taiwan, and although the issue of Taiwan is still relevant
today, the communist government is the one that won the seat in the United Nations; furthermore,

China’s economic conditions have drastically improved in comparison with the 1960s. China’s
goals could not have remained as they were in the 1960s for the simple reason that the stage is
completely different. Second, China’s strategy to achieve its various goals has also changed,
constantly adapting to best fit the conditions of the time: during the 1960s, China’s actions of
course had an element of strategy, but they seemed more experimental and reactionary than the
well thought-out and planned actions that we have grown more accustomed to from China during
recent years.

The strategic differences between the 1960s and today do not, however, reflect a

stark change in China’s diplomatic goals and interests, but are rather the result of China
perfecting its diplomatic methodology through a process of trial and error and adapting to
evolving economic conditions.
My goal in this chapter is to introduce the dynamics of China’s diplomatic relations in

Africa during the 1960s, and to show how they have evolved into a wholly different set of
dynamics during the twenty-first century. Even the means by which China strove to achieve its

goals — mostly aid and infrastructure projects during the 1960s and evolving towards a more
trade-based environment in the twenty-first century — have undergone drastic transformations.
The Beijing-Taipei Feud during the 1960s
The establishment of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1949 started a bitter feud
between the communist government of the PRC, located on the mainland, and the nationalist

government of the Republic of China (ROC), located in Taiwan.

Although both governments

were clearly established and coexisting — however strained the relationship — neither was willing
to accept the existence of two Chinas.

The way in which both governments fought for

recognition was through competition over China’s seat as one of the five permanent members on
the Security Council in the United Nations (UN).

Since neither the PRC nor the ROC was

willing to coexist as two separate entities, they started a life-size political version of musical
chairs; both fighting for the only chair available to them in this tense political atmosphere they
were both creating, and which would last until 1971, when China’s communist government
finally replaced the ROC in the UN.
Africa’s role in the PRC’s fight for legitimacy turned out to be crucial. By 1960, Colonial
tule in Africa was coming to an end, and three-quarters of the continent had already gained
independence (Wallerstein, 1986, 13). For China, these newly independent African nations
represented an opportunity to gain support for recognition of the PRC as the one and only China.
Starting with Egypt in 1956 (Wei, 1982, 23), and continuing to this day, African nations have
gradually rallied behind the PRC, establishing diplomatic ties with the PRC, and supporting its
“One China” cause.

One of the ways in which the PRC and the ROC competed for these newly independent
nations’ recognition was by hurriedly acknowledging each of those nations’ legitimacy as soon as
they gained their independence in the hopes that they would be rewarded by receiving those

nations’ recognition of legitimacy in return. The results, as seen in table | and further illustrated
in figure 1, showed a very close race between the PRC’s and the ROC’s performance during the
first few years of the 1960s, followed by a sharp decline in PRC recognition, as well as a sharp

increase of ROC recognition, in the period coinciding with Mao Zedong’s Great Proletarian
Cultural Revolution.

Starting in 1970, however, the tendency started to reverse, as the PRC

gained in recognition and the ROC’s recognition started to decline dramatically, until finally, in

1978, the PRC was acknowledged as legitimate by forty-one African nations, and the ROC only
by five. The main reason for African nations shifting their allegiance from the ROC to the PRC
as of 1970 probably stems from the larger amount of aid provided by the PRC.

Another reason

for the shift lies in the PRC’s emphasis on mutual non-interference in African domestic affairs.
Expecting reciprocity for recognition was not the only way in which the PRC proceeded
to gain international recognition for the PRC’s legitimacy. China’s Communist government
supported several revolutionary groups throughout Africa, specifically those groups in countries
whose official governments supported the ROC and showed no sign or willingness to reconsider
their position.

This phenomenon occurred mostly in Southern Africa “against black governments

unfriendly to the PRC (Madagascar and Malawi), against colonial governments (Angola and
Mozambique), or against white governments (Rhodesia and South Africa)” (Wei, 1982, 237).

Table 1: ROC

Year

and PRC

relations with African nations: a Timeline
Diplomatic
Relations
with PRC

Africse ent

Diplomatic
Relations
with ROC

Neutral

1949

4

0

1956

2

2

8

1

1957

1

6

9

1

1958
1959

2

10
10

6

3
4

2
3

1960

5
3

27

7

1961
1962
1963
1964
1965

11

9

29
33
35
36
38

8
10
13
17
17

12
16
19
15
14

1966

9
7
3
4
7

40

14

18

8

1967

40

13

1968

18

9

42

13

21

1969

8

42

13

22

1970
1971

7

42
42

15
22

22
18

5
2

1972
1973
1974

42
42
43

27
29
34

14
12
8

1
1
1

1975
1976

48
49

37
39

8
7

3
3

1977

50

40

6

4

1978

51

41

5

5

Source: Wei, 1982, 28.
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The communist government’s involvement in Africa also included several aid programs
in the form of grants, interest-free and low-interest loans, and technical assistance.

Between

1959

and 1974, China’s aid to African nations represented 41.1% of China’s total aid during that same
time period, a percentage that is very telling of the importance China accorded to establishing
relations with African nations.

This percentage goes to show that even though China’s level of

economic development at the time was not high enough to create significant trade relations with
African nations (see chapter 3 for more information on China’s economic involvement on the
African continent), much of China’s aid development projects were set in Africa, reflecting the
more strategic aspect of investing towards gaining international recognition and international

10

legitimization of their regime by using African support as a stepping stone to gain access to the
United Nations Security Council, which in turn, would allow the PRC a degree of international

power and influence higher than ever previously enjoyed in modern history.
As mentioned above, the PRC proceeded to invest in various aid donations and
infrastructure projects throughout the African continent in order to ensure stable relationships

with various nations, and ultimately secure their support in the UN.

These projects included the

financing and construction of the Tan-Zam railroad (Lyman, 2009) — the largest of all Chinese
aid programs and the cost of which amounted to a total of around USD 529.2 million (Wei, 1982,
48) — as well as the construction of a dam and hydro-electric power station in Guinea (Wei, 1982,
114). Other projects, such as the financing and construction of various Olympic-size stadiums
across Africa’s Western coast, failed to serve the purpose of furthering African economic
development in any way (Lyman, 2005), leaving me to infer that these were somehow intended
as “gifts” to symbolize China’s long-term dedication to the African continent, in a similar manner

as the Statue of Liberty was a gift from France to the United States, symbolizing the friendship
they had established during the American Revolution (The National Park Service, 2006). I must,
however, venture to add a few more incentives for China to shower various African nations with
such outrageous “gifts.” Not only did China finance these projects, but Chinese workers also
provided for the majority of the labor responsible for building those infrastructures.
Another compelling aspect of the PRC’s struggle to achieve legitimacy is illustrated by
the many visits of then Premier Zhou Enlai, as well as other important PRC political figures, to
the African continent.

During the highest period of Chinese activity in the 1960s, Premier Zhou

Enlai embarked on a two-month tour of thirteen African nations, which took place at the end of
1963, and lasted until early 1964 (Wei, 1982, 36).

The highlight of Zhou’s African tour occurred

on January 15, 1964, when he gave an interview to the Ghana News Agency, and set forth his
11

“Eight Principles Governing China’s Economic and Technical Aid to Other Countries.” As these
Eight Principles form the basis of China’s diplomatic and economic involvement in Africa, I feel
it necessary to report them here in their totality:

(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)

The Chinese government always bases itself on the principle of equality and mutual benefit in
providing aid to other countries. It never regards such as a kind of unilateral alms but as
something mutual.
In providing aid to other countries, the Chinese government strictly respects the sovereignty of
the recipient countries, and never asks for any privileges or attaches any conditions.
The Chinese government provides economic aid in the form of interest-free or low-interest
loans and extends the time limit for the repayment so as to lighten the burden of the recipient
countries as far as possible.
In providing aid to other countries, the purpose of the Chinese government is not to make the
recipient countries dependent on China but to help them embark on the road of self-reliance
step by step.
The Chinese government tries its best to help the recipient countries build projects which
require less investment while yielding quicker results, so that the recipient governments may
increase their income and accumulate capital.
The Chinese government provides the best-quality equipment and material of its own
manufacture at international market prices. If the equipment and material provided by the
Chinese government are not up to the agreed specifications and quality, the Chinese
government undertakes to replace them.

(7)

In giving any particular technical assistance, the Chinese government will see to it that the

(8)

personnel of the recipient country fully master such techniques.
The experts dispatched by the Chinese government to help in construction in the recipient
countries will have the same standard of living as the experts of the recipient country. The
Chinese experts are not allowed to make any special demands or enjoy any special amenities.

Source: Afro-Asian Solidarity Against Imperialism (Peking, 1964), pp.149-150; Peking
Review, no. 34 (August 21, 1964), p.16.

In comparison with the conditional nature of other nations’ diplomatic relations
agreements — such as that of the United States, Western Europe, and the Soviet Union — that all

included the stipulation that certain domestic political demands be met before relations could be
normalized, the Chinese principles for diplomatic relations were much less stringent, which made

them very appealing to imperialist-weary African nations. Before being granted independence,
African colonies suffered from those capitalist pressures that were put onto them by their colonial

masters.

Upon independence, many of these nations rejected capitalism, some even going so far

as rejecting democracy, as a means of rejecting the oppression of their former colonizers. This
particular aspect proved to be extremely beneficial to China’s communist government for two

12

reasons. First, the PRC had been particularly vocal about its anti-imperial and anti-colonial
stances since the end of World War II. Second, the PRC presented its developmental model as an
attractive alternative to both capitalism and democracy.

Indeed, when the PRC first started

entertaining diplomatic relations with African nations, several socialist nations such as Ghana,
Guinea, Mali, Mauritania, Tanzania, and Zambia were very eager to support the PRC instead of
turning to Taiwan, the Soviet Union, the United States, or other Western nations such as Great
Britain (Yen, 2008, 2). The fact that China offered a third alternative to the two Cold War

models presented by the United States and the Soviet Union was very alluring to African nations,
who wanted to avoid having to pick sides in a potentially devastating war.
Although Chinese motives were mostly self-interested, Chinese aid did abide by Zhou’s
third principle of keeping the loans at low-interest or even interest-free levels.

The total amount

of loans to twenty-five sub-Saharan African nations from 1959 to 1974 amounted to US$1206.4
million (this amount is expressed in terms of 1982 dollars), and most of these loans’ payment

plans were set at almost absurdly lenient levels, for the most part being “repayable in goods over
a period of ten to thirty years, beginning five to ten years after the aid was given” (Wei, 1982,
48).
Chinese assistance to Africa also reflected Zhou’s sixth principle by investing in high
yielding enterprises, which required little infrastructure (Wei, 1982, 48).

Indeed, most Chinese

aid and development projects dealt with light industry, agriculture, medicine, and transportation.
This type of assistance, though representative of China’s long-term vision for Sino-African
relations, first attracted African interest on a short-term level to rapidly increase their GDP and
productivity levels.

The PRC also ascribed particular importance to inviting African leaders to China.

Along

with many other high-ranked officials, forty-one Africans heads of government visited China
13

between the period of 1960 and 1978 (Wei, 1982, 62). By organizing these official visits, the
PRC was internationally consolidating the notion that they were a legitimate government.

The

high rate of African leaders that visited China served as a symbol to show the world that nations
were increasingly accepting the PRC government as a legitimate sovereign state.

Although Mao

Zedong himself never visited Africa, other lower-ranking officials of the PRC did, and many

African state leaders got to meet Mao during their trip to Beijing.
The battle for legitimacy reached its conclusion on October 6, 1971, when the PRC finally
replaced the ROC on the UN’s Security Council.

The support of African nations turned out to be

the deciding factor; “A third (34 percent) of Peking’s seventy-six votes came from Africa.
Ironically, an even larger proportion (43 percent) of Taipei’s thirty-five votes came from Africa,
but the number was much smaller. Fifteen African nations voted for Taipei, twenty-six for
Peking, including four which still had diplomatic relations with Taipei” (Wei, 1982, 384).
Representing a third of the total number of votes, it would have been impossible for the PRC to

replace the ROC in the UN if they hadn’t made such considerable efforts to win over African
nations.

An interesting aspect of the ROC’s African policy is that it did not place an emphasis on
trying to influence African nations on an ideological level.

Although the nationalists did try to

influence African nations towards rejecting communism, they did not, in return, try to impose or
even introduce an alternative of their own.

This attitude of non-interference into other nations’

domestic affairs, similar to that of the PRC, could have benefited the ROC had Africa not stood

in awe of the PRC’s massive territory, population, and potential resources. (Wei, 1982, 290-1)
A Summary of China’s 1960s diplomacy in Africa
The setting for Beijing’s diplomatic relations in the 1960s appears to be mostly
experimental.

Even though the PRC had a clear goal in place — that of gaining legitimacy over
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A Summary of China’s 1960s diplomacy in Africa

The setting for Beijing’s diplomatic relations in the 1960s appears to be mostly
experimental.

Even though the PRC had a clear goal in place — that of gaining legitimacy over
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the ROC — its methods seemed more reactionary than strategic, more based on broad principles
than on specific details unique to the situation, more vague than detailed.

Indeed, in many cases,

the PRC provided assistance or increased assistance to an African nation in reaction to prior aid
offers by the ROC (and for ideological reasons, also the Soviet Union).

Examples of the PRC’s

“copycat” tactics are numerous: Zhou Enlai’s 1963 African tour was actually preceded by the
nationalist government’s six-week tour of sixteen African nations led by the ROC’s foreign
Minister Shen Chang-huan (Wei, 1982, 298); the PRC’s agricultural aid projects in Africa were
actually implemented in reaction and imitation of the ROC’s agricultural activities on the

continent that started in the early years of the 1960s (Wei, 1982, 403); even China’s military
involvement in countries such as Somalia was preceded by that of the Soviet Union (Prybyla,

1964, 1138). Even when the PRC’s tactics were not implemented in direct imitation of prior
ROC, or Soviet, actions, they were extremely broad, as exemplified by the scattered nature of
Chinese involvement of the continent, whether it be through attending multi-national
conferences, establishing various types of bilateral agreements — such as friendship treaties,
cultural agreements, trade agreements, and economic and technical agreements — or even through
propaganda, sending envoys to Africa, granting scholarships to African students, or providing
weapons to various militia factions, and the list goes on.
Even though China’s methodology in implementing its foreign policy in Africa during the

1960s is unfocused and tentative, the policy’s main goal is not. One can observe through China’s
emphasis on aid rather than trade, through Zhou’s and others’ lack of ideological rhetoric,

through the PRC’s frantic attempts to gain diplomatic support by any means possible, etc. that
China’s foreign policy’s primary goal during the 1960s was diplomatic rather than economic or
ideological in nature, thereby supporting hypothesis | as expressed in the introduction of this
paper.
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China’s diplomatic Motivations in Africa during the twenty-first century

The setting for China’s diplomatic involvement in Africa during the twenty-first century
has been dramatically different from that of the 1960s; having achieved its goal of obtaining its

seat on the UN’s Security Council — thereby ejecting the ROC from that position — and also
having completed its objective of breaking out of its isolationist stance imposed by the United
Sates and the Soviet Union, the PRC has been able to concentrate on more long-term goals since
that decisive date of its accession to the UN Security Council in 1971.
The PRC has not, however, forgotten the Taiwan issue, and the two countries have yet to

find an agreement over whether or not Taiwan should be granted its status of independent nation.
The PRC did not rest upon the 1971 verdict of the UN to replace Taiwan with the Communist
government of the Mainland, and has always been fearful that the situation might reverse itself.
Therefore the PRC has relentlessly tried to limit Taitwan’s influence and activity in Africa,
managing to narrow down the number of nations in support of Taiwan from eighteen in 1971 to
five in 1978 (see table 1), and finally to four on January 15, 2008 when Malawi decided to
establish official diplomatic ties with the Mainland (Rotberg, 2008, 2), thereby causing Taiwan to

revoke its forty-two year long diplomatic relationship with the African nation (Hsu, 2008).
Increasing support from African nations has greatly helped advance Chinese ambitions,

not only in regards to Taiwan, but also more recently in gaining accession to the WTO, and in
gaining international support to hold the 2008 Summer Olympics in the nation’s capital, Beijing
(Rotberg, 2008, 2).

Considering how many western and democratic nations view China with

guarded skepticism, it would have been nearly impossible for China to have achieved any of the

above-mentioned feats without the support of these African nations.

It is therefore not surprising

that China would want to cherish and strengthen these relationships as much as possible so as not
to lose support, and therefore credibility, in the future.
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Although China’s relationship with Africa started in the 1960s on a rather reactionary
basis towards Taiwan and the Soviet Union, it has evolved into a carefully planned, strategic,
symbiotic, and long-term based relationship, which extends much further than the UN and the

Taiwan issue, and can be applied to almost any circumstance in which China would need
international support.

Of course, this does not necessarily apply to China’s individual dealings

with non-A frican nations, or regional dealings that do not include Africa.

In the 1960s China

sought to establish itself as a more powerful and influential player on the international political
scene, today China has achieved that goal and seeks to keep and solidify its position of power.
Examples of China’s emphasis on developing long-term diplomatic relationships on the
African continent are numerous: “China has established embassies in thirty-eight of sub-Saharan
Africa’s forty-eight countries. It has exchanged military attachés with about fourteen African
nations. It has created Confucius Institutes in several national capitals and partially funds a
serious think tank in South Africa.

President Robert Mugabe, in Zimbabwe, decreed the

mandatory teaching of Mandarin in the University of Zimbabwe.

Throughout Africa,

scholarships are available for study in China, and student exchanges are common.

The Chinese

Communist Party sponsors frequent people-to-people visits to and from Africa” (Rotberg, 2008,
3). The most convincing example of that emphasis on the development of long-term stable
diplomatic Sino-African relationships, however, rests in the numbers.

When making a regional

comparison of the dispersion of Chinese aid over an extended period of time from 1960 to 1989,
one can observe how important Africa is to China. Africa is, on a regional level, the largest
recipient of Chinese aid, and even if one factors in a considerable margin of error due to China’s
notorious reputation for lack of transparency, only the compounded regions of the Middle East

and South Asia come close to equaling the total amount of aid provided to Africa throughout that
thirty year time span.
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Table 2: Chinese Aid by Region,

1960-1989
°

Cumulative Amount (estimate)
Recipient region

East Asia
Latin America
Middle East and South Asia
Africa
TOTAL

In Millions of US$

514
314
4,053
4,728
9,655

Source: Brautigam, 2009, 199.

It is evident from the above-mentioned examples of Sino-African relations that China sees
Africa as a long-term investment; the question is: why is that the case?

An obvious answer is that

“Africa constitutes the largest voting bloc in the UN and can provide needed support in the
General Assembly on various issues” (U.S. Cong. Committee on International Relations, 2005).

Another answer, closely related to the first, is that Africa provides a strong network of support
and security for China when operating in the international political arena. A third answer is, of
course, economic in nature: African resources are vast and provide an ideal source for Chinese
import, but African nations are temperamental, and it is therefore necessary for China to establish
strong friendly diplomatic ties with them in order to ensure a reliable influx of those resources
without fear of being cut off.
An interesting consequence of China’s diplomatic relations with Africa is that some of

China’s recent diplomatic activities in Africa seem to interfere with the countries’ internal affairs,
technically constituting a direct violation of Zhou’s principle of mutual non-interference in
foreign affairs, the most important of which has been the recent implementation of Special
Economic Zones entirely based on the Chinese development model.

The fact that China has also

taken responsibility for constructing these zones represents further interference in these nations’
affairs. The reason for which African nations seem to comply with and accept these interferences

is that they are not implemented as a condition of Chinese aid or trade, but rather are

implemented with the acquiescence of African nations and are seen to be an intricate part of
China and Africa’s growing symbiotic relationship. These interferences are, for the most part,
accepted by African nations because they are not explicitly labeled as constraints or conditions
for aid, as is the case with Western aid, which can be suspended at any moment, should a country

fail to live up to its democratic requirements.
China’s diplomatic endeavors during this first decade of the twenty-first century seem to
serve much broader than they used to be during the 1960s; they serve to improve bilateral
relations with various African nations; they serve to consolidate China’s international power and
influence within the United Nations; to a certain extent they serve to export Chinese culture and
ideals into Africa. But most of all, they seem to serve China’s economic interests. Even though
they are an increasingly important and vital part of China’s foreign policy, diplomatic goals no
longer seem to be the driving factor for China’s foreign policy in Africa.

Instead, it seems that

economic interests have usurped that role, and have relayed diplomatic motivations to the role of
serving economic ones, supporting hypothesis 2’s supposition that diplomatic interests no longer
serve as the main motivational force behind China’s foreign policy.
A Comparison between the 1960s and Today

China’s diplomatic involvement on the African continent during the 1960s was manifold
and multi-purposed.

China’s ability to influence those nations, however, was limited by China’s

level of economic development, and worsened by China’s internal instability during the Great
Leap Forward, and then later during the Great Proletarian Revolution.

Economic limitations

prevented China from establishing significant trade relations with African nations during the
1960s.

However, due to China’s willingness to provide aid to African nations despite its own

lackluster economic conditions, due to China’s extensive and persistent exchange of envoys, and
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most importantly as a result of China’s emphasis on anti-imperialism and alternatives to Western
models, African nations gradually rallied behind the PRC and allowed the communist
government to achieve the primary goal of its foreign policy at the time: gaining international
recognition for its status as a legitimate nation and “the one and only China.”
When comparing China’s diplomatic endeavors during the 1960s with those of the

twenty-first century, the most important element to consider is the economic factor. During the
1960s, African nations’ greatest incentive to establish diplomatic relations with the PRC came as
the result of an elimination process through which China seemed the least likely to return
Africa’s newly independent nations to a state of colonial submission. While some incentives
today still stem from a desire for protection from Western interference into their domestic affairs,
China’s rapid economic development have provided African countries with the added incentive
of a potential mutually beneficial relationship with the world’s newest economic giant. Whereas
most American relations with developing countries focus more on accumulating as many benefits
for America with little regards to the benefits that could be acquired by the recipients of that

“benevolence,” China has proven itself throughout the years as being willing to give more than it
receives, as made evident by the high levels of aid provided to African countries in comparison to

the amount of Sino-African trade. Indeed, China’s actions on the African continent, though
predominantly motivated by selfish ambitions, have shown more elements of selflessness than
have those of other Western and more capitalist nations.
China’s focus since the 1960s on establishing long-term diplomatic ties with African
nations has paid off, and China’s new economic status on the international scene has in turn
served as a powerful tool to strengthen those already existing ties, and to create new ones.

Should China’s economy continue to develop in a sound manner, it is likely that China’s
diplomatic ties will strengthen accordingly, perhaps even leading to the last four remaining
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African nations to reject their recognition of Taiwan in favor of Beijing.

Furthermore, China’s

emphasis on mutual non-interference and its actual implementation might prove alluring to other
nations outside of Africa, which might in time allow China to threaten America’s hegemonic
status as the world’s most influential diplomatic leader.
Although China’s diplomatic motivations have always seemed to contain a long-term
oriented vision, evident in the strong and durable ties it has created with most African nations,
those motivations have drastically changed since their beginnings in the 1960s and today.

During

the 1960s, China’s diplomatic interests focused around a single goal that also served as the single
most important goal within China’s foreign policy.

Today, China’s diplomatic goals are

manifold, all converging toward the single goal of furthering economic interests. During the
1960s, China’s diplomatic efforts were tentative, reactionary, and broad, whereas today, China

has been able to perfect its diplomatic strategy and now offers well-organized and thought-out
plans to strengthen its bilateral ties. Defined by extensive alterations to its goals and
methodology, the diplomatic motivations of China’s foreign policy find very few constants,
thereby supporting my third hypothesis as stated in the introduction of this paper.
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Chapter HU: China’s Ideological Motivations in Africa

The 1960s and the Sino-Soviet Rift
Ideology was an important part of Mao Zedong’s vision for China throughout his rule.
Though initially based on the Soviet model of Marxism-Leninism, Mao’s path diverged from that
of the Soviet Union, creating deep tensions between the two governments. The division between
China and the Soviet Union became especially apparent after the implementation of Mao’s
“Great Leap Forward,” an economic and political five-year plan that was meant to propel the
nation into an era of great prosperity, but instead resulted in a massive failure and only lasted
three years, from 1958 to 1961. The failure of Mao’s five-year plan brought about widespread
criticism from the Soviet Union, but “Soviet criticism of Mao’s economic blunders and

pretensions to ideological leadership of the Communist world nevertheless was matched by
Chinese criticism of both the Soviet repudiation of Stalinist policies and the Soviet advocacy of
“peaceful coexistence” with the West” (Wei, 1982, 17). The Sino-Soviet rift became explicitly
apparent when “Moscow withdrew aid to the Chinese nuclear development program on 20 June

1959, and in August 1960 all Soviet technicians aiding Chinese economic development were
withdrawn” (Larkin, 1971, 41). The Soviet Union’s complete withdrawal from all aspects of

Chinese affairs was catastrophic for China; the Soviet Union had, in effect, taken away China’s
largest source of developmental aid, deprived China of its largest trade market, and ultimately left
China completely vulnerable to foreign threats by removing its security guarantee. At this point
in time, China had no choice but to reevaluate its political and economic strategies, realizing that
maintaining an isolationist stance without Soviet support could prove to be fatal to the nation’s
hopes for economic and ideological development, and would ultimately leave the nation at the
mercy of imperialist forces, threatening the PRC’s recently acquired sovereignty and political
independence.
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China needed to expand beyond its own borders and acquire new allies in order to veer
away from the vulnerable position in which the Soviet Union had left it, and also secure a new
import market to replace that of the Soviet Union. Newly independent African nations seemed to
be the perfect potential allies for the CCP (Chinese Communist Party), seeing as they had also

been left in an extremely vulnerable position by their former colonizers, shared China’s antiimperialist feelings, and presented themselves as resource-rich sources upon which China would
be able to build new trade relations.
The Soviet Union was not the only nation China needed to protect itself against; the
United States also voiced dissatisfaction with the PRC’s ideological beliefs, openly supporting
the ROC as the only legitimate government of China. The PRC’s ideological involvement on the
African continent during the 1960s was therefore directly correlated with its desire to separate
itself from American and Soviet pressures to conform to their individual ideological values of
democracy and Marxist-Leninism, respectively (Larkin, 1971, 1). In my opinion, China’s

experience in being dependent on Soviet protection and aid, followed by the Soviet Union’s
ensuing “betrayal,” allowed the CCP to realize that they needed to concentrate on building longterm stable relationships with countries, as opposed to short-term relationships of convenience,
all the while making sure never to become dependent on them, as they had been on the Soviet

Union.
There exists a general consensus among scholars and those who study Sino-African
relations that starting as early as 1958, “China was embarked on a series of policies radically
different from those of the Soviets both in style and in content, and an evolution was in progress

that would soon lead to an open clash between Europe-centered and Asia-centered forms of
Communism” (Schram, 1967, 283) that would take place on African soil in the form of a race to
try to secure the role of becoming the world’s most influential communist leader. Even
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Emmanuel John Hevi, an African student who studied in China for eighteen months, asserted in

his 1966 book entitled The Dragon’s Embrace that as “the Chinese communists are prepared to
go to all lengths to promote their system, it becomes clear that the regime in Peking will never
abandon the policy of ‘peace through war’ until such time as all the world has become socialist,

as China defines socialism” (Hevi, 1966, 35). Others, such as Li Anshan in his 2008 paper
entitled China’s New Policy toward Africa, distinguish between China’s domestic and foreign
policies, but still come to the conclusion that “China’s ultraleftist policy had some impact on its
foreign policy and Chinese diplomats began to “export revolution” to Africa” (Li, 2008, 23).

I have yet to come across a single scholarly paper that dares challenge the status quo that
China’s primary goal during the 1960s was to expand communism as far beyond its borders as it

possibly could. However, I have also remained completely unconvinced by these claims. While
lagree that a split did occur between Soviet and Chinese styles of communism, I believe that the

split occurred on a domestic level, and did not actually permeate China’s foreign policy. Far
from prompting China to adopt imperial or colonial aspects for its foreign policy, the Sino-Soviet
rift seems to have shifted China’s foreign policy toward a more pragmatic direction. Although
there exists much rhetoric about Chinese communist expansion at the time, that rhetoric is mostly
present in non-Chinese scholars’ interpretations of China’s possible intentions. The rhetoric of

the communist leadership itself is remarkably non-ideological, using anti-imperialist and anticapitalist jargon to bring to light China and A frica’s common struggle to become independent
from these various oppressing ties.
China’s new emphasis on “self-reliance” was one of the topics addressed by Zhou Enlai
during his 1963-1964 African tour, calling for African nations to rally behind them and to reject
Soviet “aid, implicitly recalling China’s own failure to create a dependable aid relationship with
the Soviet Union” (Larkin, 1971, 69). With a surprising lack of ideological jargon, the Chinese
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diligently appealed to African nations’ racial and anti-imperialist sentiments in their attempt to
degrade Soviet influence on the continent. By empathizing with African nations and
emphasizing their similar historical pasts of being oppressed by “white imperialists,” China was,
to a certain extent, able to subtly push its own development model and the need for Sino-A frican
cooperation onto friendly African nations. Nonetheless, even though certain African nations
implemented some aspects of China’s revolutionary development model, no African nation ever

fully adopted it during the 1960s. An example of this occurred in Algeria, when the National
Liberation Front opted for China’s model for national liberation through “violent armed struggle
as the only effective revolutionary method” (Yu, 1980, 178) to rid themselves of imperialist
tendencies. In this sense, Algeria did not adopt China’s method for economic development as
dictated by Mao Zedong, nor did it adhere to the communist ideology of the PRC — more
commonly known at the time as ‘““Mao Zedong Thought” — but instead borrowed certain aspects
of the Communist Party’s initial methods for popular revolution that allowed them to create an
environment in which they could implement their own ideas for development. Using China’s
revolutionary model to overthrow the existing government hardly implies that these groups

supported Chinese communism, simply that they were dissatisfied with the current government,
recognized the potential merits of the Chinese model, and implemented it so that they could
overthrow and replace the existing government.

When confronted with unfriendly governments who supported the Soviet Union or the
ROC, the PRC judged it necessary to adopt less conventional methods, extending support to
dissident militia groups by funding their missions to overthrow the existing government.

Had

China’s primary motivational force been ideological, it would only have made sense that those
groups it supported favored or were inclined to adopting the Chinese communist model.

It is

important to note that China’s goals do not seem to have been primarily ideological, considering
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that the PRC accorded more importance to gaining support against the Soviet Union as a means
of increasing their levels of national security and to avoid becoming dependent on others, as they
had been on the Soviet Union before the rift. This can be seen in China’s willingness to support
various government types, political movements, and militia groups from various political
ideologies across the spectrum. An example of China’s desire to gain support against the Soviet
Union is apparent Eisenman’s analysis of Angola where “at separate times — and sometimes at
the same time — the CPC supported the ruling Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola, as
well as its rivals, the National Liberation Front of Angola and the National Union for the Total

Independence of Angola (UNITA)” (Eisenman, 2008, 230).
The PRC’s ability to shape African politics and ideology during the 1960s, though nonnegligible, was in fact rather limited, however, because of the simple fact that China’s economy

was underdeveloped, and therefore the PRC was unable to establish the necessary trade
relationships required to have a significant impact on African internal affairs. Financial and
technological limitations constrained the amount of aid and assistance the PRC could provide, a
crucial factor that allowed the Soviet Union to retain high levels of support across the African
continent all throughout the 1960s.

(Wei, 1982, 40)

Economic disparities between China and the Soviet Union allowed the latter to maintain a

strong upper hand in regards to establishing relationships on the African continent from the mid1950s up until 1966. This point becomes evident through Yu’s comparison of Chinese and
Soviet activity on the African continent when he states that “[nJot only did the USSR offer aid to

a greater number of African states — 17, against 11 for China — but its aid commitments also
amounted to more than four times those of China.

[...] There was Sino-Soviet competition in 10

instances, with the Soviet Union being the major Communist donor in 8 of the 10 cases” (Yu,

1980, 169).
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Starting in 1966, however, China became the largest Communist aid donor to the African

continent, effectively surpassing the Soviet Union.

Yu further states that “[nJot only did China

offer almost twice the amount of economic assistance that the Soviet Union did, but the PRC also
extended aid to 29 states as opposed to 22 for the USSR.

Second, there were 16 instances of

direct Sino-Soviet competition, and China constituted the leading donor in 12 cases.

Third,

China’s economic presence now extended to most of Africa. [...] With the exception of
Somalia, Soviet economic aid continued to be concentrated in North Africa” (Yu, 1980, 172).
China’s emphasis on non-interference in other nations’ domestic affairs brought further
Soviet disdain for China’s selective use of Marxist-Leninist components. But in the end it was
this ability to be more flexible that allowed China to gain an edge over the Soviet Union in terms
of African affairs. Legum confirms this point in his analysis of Chinese and Soviet activity on
the African continent when he states that “Soviet diplomacy [was] regarded as clumsy or even
downright bullying in its attempts to influence African leaders to adopt hostile attitudes toward
the PRC. Such actions [were] a major irritant to most African countries and political movements,
many of which [sought] to maintain a strictly neutral position vis-a-vis the two world Communist
centers. By contrast, the Chinese almost everywhere on the continent [were] admired for the
sensitivity of their diplomacy” (Legum, 1980, 18).
When comparing Soviet and Chinese actions on the African continent during the 1960s,
Soviet contributions initially far outpaced those of the Chinese. But even if this trend had
continued, it is likely that African nations would still have turned to the Chinese as a more stable
partner. Soviet actions in Africa were sporadic, localized, strategically implemented to benefit
the Soviet Union above all else, and failure was much more prevalent than success. The Soviet
Union failed to implement its promises of aid, military funding, and military support in several
instances, most notably in Egypt, the Sudan, and Somalia, causing African nations to doubt the
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stability and strength of Soviet support.

In the end, Soviet failure to impress solid relationships

with African nations depended “less on the capacity of the Soviet Union to provide aid than on
the degree to which the economic and military assistance offered by Moscow [was] perceived by
Africans to be relevant to their aspirations and interests” (Legum, 1980, 34).

Indeed, the Soviets

placed too big an emphasis on implementing their vision and creating relationships in which
African nations would be dependent on Soviet support while the Chinese, having also fallen
victim to the Soviets’ failure to follow through on their promises a few years earlier, were careful
not to repeat those mistakes themselves when interacting with African nations.
Sino-Soviet rivalry eventually came to an end, however, upon the dismantling of the
Soviet Union, and not truly in an outright victory of either side on the African continent.
Although the collapse of the Soviet Union certainly did allow the Chinese to continue operating
in Africa in a less frictional environment.

Prior to the collapse of the Soviet Union, however, the

trend of support had been reversed, and African nations were more open to interacting with the
pragmatic Chinese, who gave them the freedom to act as they wished within their domestic
environment, than with the Soviets, who insisted on expanding their ideological and economic
models of development into Africa.
Although western rhetoric stubbornly insists on the idea that China’s primary goal during
the 1960s was to expand communism and become the leader of a new communist world, those
ideas probably originated more from Cold War fears of Soviet/communist expansion than
through actual attempts from the part of the Chinese to expand communism beyond its borders.
Just as Western rhetoric insists that China’s goal was ideological, but I have not observed
anything in China’s rhetoric or in its actions to support that view. China’s actions on the
continent during the 1960s simply show a desire to create diplomatic ties with countries that
would allow China to gain support for international recognition and to assert itself as a separate
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entity from the Soviet Union, neither of which necessarily require or imply communist
expansion, thereby supporting my fourth hypothesis as formulated in the introduction.
China’s Continued Pragmatism in the Twenty-First Century
After the fall of the Soviet Union, however, and also in accordance with China’s trend of
being pragmatic rather than dogmatic in its foreign policy, China has continued to extend a
friendly hand toward African nations and parties regardless of ideology. From Zhou Enlai’s 1964
“Eight Principles Governing China’s Economic and Technical Aid to Other Countries,” emerged
Deng Xiaoping’s 1978 “four principles of party-to-party relations: independence, complete
equality, mutual respect, and noninterference in each others internal affairs” (Eisenman, 2008,

232), and from there have emerged the Communist Party of China’s International Department’s
(CPC-ID) seven guidelines to govern its interaction with foreign political parties (Eisenman,
2008, 233) that I have reported in their totality below:
(1) “Establish a new type of relations between parties — new, sound and friendly relations.”
(2) “Every party should decide its own country’s affairs independently.”
(3) “No party should judge the achievements and mistakes of foreign parties on the basis of its own
experience.”
(4) “All parties should be completely equal; they should respect each other and not interfere in each other’s
internal affairs.”
(5) “Ideological differences should not be obstacles to establishing a new type of party-to-party relations.
When developing exchanges and cooperation with foreign parties, parties in the various countries
should proceed from the spirit of seeking common ground while reserving differences.”
(6) “The purposes of exchanges and cooperation with foreign parties should be to promote the
development of state-to-state relations.”
(7) “In their relations with foreign parties, all parties should look to the future and forget old scores.”

Source: Eisenman, 2008, 233.

It is first important to note that Zhou’s Principles and these new guidelines apply to
different aspects of China’s foreign policy; while Zhou’s Eight Principles apply to trade and aid,
these new guidelines apply to the political aspect of China’s foreign policy. Zhou’s Principles
are still very much in place and still operate as the foundation for all of China’s economic
endeavors abroad. On the other hand, these new guidelines mirror Zhou’s Principles in several
ways, notably through emphasizing non-interference and mutual benefit, but their most
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interesting attribute rests in main aspect in which they differ from Zhou’s Principles: ideology.
While Zhou’s principles avoided any mention of ideology — a very clever decision considering
Africa’s tendency at the time to quickly shy away from countries who seemed likely to want to
impose their ideology upon it - CPC-ID’s new guidelines take an even bolder step, especially in
the fifth guideline, by explicitly stating that differences in ideology should not be a barrier to
friendship and cooperation.

China’s willingness to explicitly disregard a nation’s ideological

background is truly an unsettling factor for the rest of the western world for a variety of reasons;
one of which is that this gives China an immense economic advantage in being able to interact

with politically unsound governments as well as governments who stubbornly refuse to abide by
Western standards and demands.

Second, due to Cold War paranoid fears of communist

expansion, Western nations were unable to recognize the already pragmatic nature of China’s

foreign policy, which, far from being a novel addition to China’s foreign policy, already existed
and was simply strengthened and explicitly reaffirmed through CPC-ID’s claim to ideological
openness. Furthermore, China can be seen, through statements of this nature, to be a more open
and understanding nation than the United States, for example. In this manner, China presents
itself to other nations as a peaceful, non-judgmental support figure in stark opposition of the
hegemonic United States who have, rightly or wrongly so, gained an international reputation for
threatening, and in some cases implementing, military intervention when other nations’ domestic

attitudes stray too far from American standards of acceptability.
Whereas the United States is notorious for imposing embargos on politically unstable and
non-democratic nations, China does the opposite and presents itself to African nations as having
“the ‘complete package:’ money, technical expertise, and the influence in such bodies as the UN
Security Council to protect the host country from international sanctions” (Lyman, 2008).

These

characteristics, coupled with a habit of lacking transparency, have given China a notoriety of its
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own, attributing to the nation a reputation for providing weapons and other military-related
materials and information to unstable governments throughout the African continent and having a
complete disregard for human rights violations committed in those countries. “China’s key
bilateral military relationships have been with Angola (training, communications upgrades, and
hardware), Nigeria, South Africa, the Sudan, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe” (Rotberg, 2008,

9-10). In Angola, for example, “China in 2008 continued to tolerate or ignore egregious human
rights infractions” (Rotberg, 2008, 14), all the while supporting its current autocratic government.

In Zimbabwe, “despite official sanctions and the almost universal condemnation of Mugabe’s
tyranny, China has sold jet fighters, tanks, armored vehicles, artillery, riot-control gear, and
radio-jamming equipment and other critical communications gear to Zimbabwe’s military”
(Rotberg, 2008, 15). The most flagrant example of China’s disregard for human rights has been
its involvement in providing weapons to the Sudan, as well as its persistent stonewalling of most
United Nations Peacekeeping missions in the area up until 2008 (Lyman, 2008). It is evident
through the aforementioned illustrations, as well as through many other cases not mentioned here,
that China’s foreign diplomacy, especially in Africa, is heavily dependent on its “mutual noninterference” clause. This refusal to interfere in African nations’ domestic issues has allowed
China to establish bilateral relationships with Africa’s most authoritarian dictatorships, and has,
as a consequence, allowed China to veto many of the UN Security Council’s resolutions based on

their claim that peacekeeping forces would entail infringing on those nations’ sovereignty, which
would be in direct violation of the terms included their bilateral agreements.
China’s emergence as a world economic power has also proved to be alluring to various
African nations. “[I]ts direct and indirect donor aid is now significant, overshadowing or
competing for influence with the United States and Europe” (Rotberg, 2008, 16). An added
bonus of Chinese aid and investment in Africa has been its lack of conditionality.
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Whereas

nations such as the United States and international organizations such as the IMF or the World
Bank tend to emphasize certain conditionality clauses, which must be fulfilled in order for aid to
ensue, China claims non-interference into domestic affairs. A perhaps unintended consequence
of China’s apparent non-interference clause is that African nations seem less wary of China’s
intentions, allowing for China to subtly insert some more typically Chinese models for
development into those nations’ domestic policies. The recent implementation of elements from
the Chinese economic development model into Africa does not, however, reflect Chinese desires

for communist expansion.

I will argue instead that this phenomenon has occurred as a result of

African nations recognizing the extent of China’s recent economic success and hoping to achieve
similar levels of economic progress for their own countries.
The success of China’s pragmatic foreign policy is certainly partially responsible for
China’s increasingly pragmatic domestic policies. While the government’s political structure
remains largely communist in style, pragmatism has become the main guiding principle for
almost all other Chinese actions in recent years, whether domestic or international. Pragmatism
allowed for Deng Xiaoping’s Opening Up reforms during the 1980s, and consequently for the
creation SEZs both in China and abroad.
Chinese models for development are rapidly popping up throughout the African continent,

the cornerstone of which is the establishment of Chinese-style Special Economic Zones (SEZs)
that are now appearing in several African nations, including Egypt, Kenya, and Mauritius.

Since

these SEZs were based on the Chinese model, it makes sense that China’s involvement in
building those infrastructures would be quite substantial.

Indeed, most of the technology

emanates from China, many of the workers are of Chinese origin, and these zones make it much

easier for China to create a larger-scale African market that could produce cheaper goods for
Chinese import.

(Davies, 2008, 137)

Although some issues have arisen, especially in terms of
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Chinese workers creating tight-knit communities instead of integrating into African societies, the
implementation of these SEZs is appearing to be a success. The lack of Chinese integration into
African society, however, is not a new phenomenon, and has dated all the way back to the 1960s;
the only difference being that Chinese immigrants in Africa are now becoming more numerous
and therefore more noticeable than before. This issue of self-segregation might become an issue
in the future, and the Chinese government should remain aware of the potential dangers this issue
could entail for the stability of its relations with African nations in the future, but that situation
has yet to become a primary obstacle to China’s increasing expansion into Africa.

The goal of establishing these economic zones in African countries is exactly the same as
it was in China when they established their own first SEZ in Shenzhen in 1981: to “provide
liberalized investment environments focused on strategic industries to attract foreign companies”
(Davies, 2008, 137).

Although Chinese motives for implementing such zones throughout the

continent are to a certain extent selfless seeing as they are a realistic method by which these
African nations could approach a decent level of prosperity, many of these motives are also
unquestionably selfish.

During the 1960s China’s ideological pragmatism in terms of foreign

policy served to further its diplomatic motivations on the African continent whereas today that

same pragmatic outlook exists to serve economic interests. In this sense, China’s ideological
motivations within its foreign policy haven’t changed much since the 1960s, as their purpose has

always been to serve the driving motivational force, whatever that force may be.
The idea of implementing the Chinese economic model as a potential model for effective
economic development has not been limited to Africa. Indeed, even Russia’s current president,
Dmitry Medvedev, has advocated that “Russia should follow the Chinese “model’”’ (Friedman,

2008, 17). Medvedev’s statement, made shortly before he became president, represents a
colossal victory for China.

Soviet failure to spread communism now contrasts starkly with the
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success of Chinese pragmatism.

The greatest success of China’s ability to be ideologically

flexible in its foreign policy despite its strongly dogmatic domestic policies is that even its main
ideological rival of the 1960s, now represented by Russia instead of the Soviet Union, has come

to accept its ideological pragmatism as the superior means to achieve prosperity.
China’s ability to transpose its economic development model into Africa also represents a
small indirect victory over the United States’ and the West’s democratic ideology, showing the
world that there might exist viable models for development other than the oft-unsuccessful
models that the United States and others have tried to impose on both cooperative and
uncooperative nations throughout the globe.
In recent years, China has shown more interest in adopting an ideologically neutral
standpoint in terms of its foreign policy than in trying to convince foreign nations to adopt its
ideologically communist political structure.

In fact, there is no evidence throughout the entire

African continent of Chinese-style party-state political apparatuses. The absence of these
apparatuses reinforces the idea that China’s foreign policy is based on pragmatic rather than
dogmatic ideas, supporting my fifth hypothesis as stated in the introduction of this paper.
A Comparison between the 1960s and Today
“Mao Zedong Thought” was the primary ideological motor for all aspects of the CCP’s

domestic activities during the 1960s. Even today, many elements of China’s domestic policies
are dominated by remnants of Mao’s ideological stronghold. However, foreign affairs have taken
a starkly different path that is already evident during the 1960s.

I believe that China’s ability to

impose domestic authoritarianism while applying foreign leniency and understanding stems from

China’s history since the end of the Imperial Era as being strongly anti-imperialist and antiexpansionist.
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During the 1960s China was mostly focused inward, and only breached its isolationism
for purposes of necessity. China’s ideological goals were also focused inward, and only became

apparent on the international scene as a result of its feud with the Soviet Union. If the PRC was
to survive the 1960s, it needed to expand beyond its borders, but the CCP was smart enough to
recognize similar feelings of anti-imperialism in Africa. For China to claim anti-imperialist
feelings while overtly conducting a strategy of communist expansion would have revealed deep

controversies in the CCP’s foreign policy. China’s strategy of mutual non-interference was
therefore a brilliant strategy that allowed China to continue operating under its communist model
at home while steadily gaining support from political groups of various types abroad.
China’s willingness to support governments whose ideological views differed greatly
from their own at the height of Mao Zedong’s rule is indicative of China’s burgeoning evolution
toward becoming a more pragmatic nation. Today, China’s pragmatic views have become
evident in both the domestic and foreign realms.

So far, the success of that path is undeniable

even despite erroneous fears of communist expansion in the minds of many Western states —
especially in the United States. Indeed, I am not sure that communism is the main threat in this
situation; rather I believe it is more accurate to fear that China as a growing economic power is
posing a threat to U.S. hegemony.

In any case, I am not sure that an emphasis on pragmatism

would be a harmful alternative to imposed democracy for developing nations.
Evidence of pragmatic behavior as the dominant ideological motivation for China’s
foreign policy in Africa both in the 1960s and today reflects a high level of continuity with the
past. The differences between the 1960s and the early years of the twenty-first century are
superficial and are mainly restricted to rhetorical differences; in the 1960s China’s rhetoric was
void of ideological jargon; today that rhetoric merely emphasizes ideological neutrality in terms

of its foreign policy. Given the superficiality of these changes it is safe to assume, in concurrence
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Chapter I; China’s Economic Motivations in Africa
An Introduction
When comparing China’s economic activities during the 1960s with its economic
activities today, it is important to note the basic situational differences upon which these

economic interactions are built. First, during the 1960s, China was confined to a state of
isolationism that was partially voluntary as a means of protection against foreign imperialism, but
was mostly imposed by the United States, which condemned China’s communist ways altogether,
as well as by the Soviet Union that resented China’s ideological developments away from the
Soviet model and towards its own type of communism.

These factors all contributed to limit

China’s trade opportunities during the 1960s, and thus stunted China’s potential economic growth
at that time. Second, and probably most significant, were Mao Zedong’s “great” economic
development plans, which greatly hindered the country’s potential to exploit its natural resources
inan efficient manner.

Once free of these aforementioned constraints, China was able to embark

on the path towards becoming the more economically prosperous nation it is today.
Although I was unable to find credible sources portraying China’s GDP during the 1960s
in large part due to the fact that China’s economic performance during that time was grossly
overestimated, historical circumstances allow us to venture a supposition about the nation’s
prosperity at the time. Indeed, the early years of the 1960s are most often associated with Mao’s
catastrophic Great Leap Forward, and consequently are antonymous with the concept of positive
economic development.

Furthermore, the later years of the 1960s coincided with Mao’s Great

Proletarian Cultural Revolution, which also contributed to worsening the nation’s already-dire
economic environment.

The initial setting for China’s economy during the 1960s was therefore

drastically different from the one we can observe today in the early years of the twenty-first

century, at which point in time China’s GDP stands second only to the United States and the
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European Union, although I choose not to include the latter body as part of the ranking because it
involves an agglomeration of states, none of which individually comes close to rivaling China’s
thriving economy, at the end of 2008, totaling an impressive US$ 7.8 trillion (The World
Factbook, 2009).
China’s Economic Motivations in Africa during the 1960s

Although economic development was a priority during the Maoist era, most of Mao’s
“great plans,” from the Great Leap Forward to the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution did more
harm than good to the country’s economy, greatly limiting China’s ability to effectively operate
on the international scene. China’s economy was essentially agricultural-based, also limiting the
types of products available for trade. Other obstacles preventing China from establishing a
booming trade relationship with the African continent were linked to transportation issues; the
long distance between China and Africa, compounded with the fact that China did not, at the
time, have a sufficiently large commercial fleet, made it difficult for China to find a way to
profitably trade with African nations (Prybyla, 1964, 1136). As a result, the volume of China’s
trade with Africa during the 1960s was not significant enough to compete with that of more
economically developed nations such as United States. China’s trade with African nations,
starting in 1950, gradually increased, rather slowly at first, and continued to do so all through the
1960s. From 1950, starting with Egypt, to 1974, China signed twenty-four official trade
agreements with African nations, all representative of the Chinese desire to secure stable relations
with those nations. (Wei, 1982, 40-2)
China’s main trade partners during the 1960s were Egypt, Tanzania, Morocco, the Sudan,
Mali, Zambia, Kenya, Nigeria, Ghana, and Uganda (Wei, 1982, 43). All throughout the sixties,
China was, for the most part, able to maintain a positive trade balance within the African
continent, as can be seen in table 3.
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Table 3: PRC-African Trade 1960-1970

(In millions of U.S. Dollars)

Year

Pre nos

Re

ors

Balance of

African Trade
as a % of

Trade

Foreign

PRC-African

Total PRC
Trade

1960

44.8

78.9

-34.1

3.1

1961
1962
1963

54.6
54.1
58.2

38.6
36.9
57

16
17.2
0.2

3.1
3.4
4.2

1964
1965

72.5
130.2

63.7
120.5

8.8
9.7

4.2
6.5

1966
1967
1968

169
161.4
137.1

79.8
68.5
52.4

89.2
92.9
84.7

5.9
5.9
5

1969

106

88

18

5

1970

138

91

47

5.3

Source: Wei, 1982, 44.
Also represented in this table is the percentage of China’s total foreign trade accounted for
by the African continent. These low percentages are indicative of the poverty of African nations
at the time, as well as their marginal economic importance to China’s economy during the 1960s.
Indeed, the limited extent of China’s trade relationship with Africa in the 1960s in comparison
with the broad extent of Chinese aid to Africa is representative of the fact that Chinese intentions
were not primarily economic during that time; they were mostly diplomatic (in regards to
Taiwan) and ideological (in regards to separating itself from the Soviet ideology).
Considering China’s development level during the 1960s, it is surprising to note that
China put such an emphasis on aid. Indeed, with an economic and technological development
level barely higher than that of these African nations it was providing aid to (Yen, 2008, 3), one
would expect China to act as an aid recipient, not an aid donor. Even though many of China’s
reasons for providing such aid on the African continent stemmed from ideological and diplomatic
reasons, it seems almost unreasonable to think that China had omitted to think of longer-term
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objectives. Although initially insecure in its methodology, I believe that China’s long-term
economic goals with the African continent are apparent as early as the 1960s. Having recently
lost its own economic support from the Soviet Union, China seems to have wanted to create an
entirely new path on the African continent; a path on which China would be the strong
benefactor, Africa the weaker recipient, both would benefit, and neither would fear abandonment

from the other. I think it is actually quite brilliant of the Chinese to have mostly limited initial
exchanges with Africa to aid instead of trade.

In this manner, China need not immediately

commit to nations that might not prove reliable in the future, and thereby threaten the Chinese
nation’s economy.

By first making these African nations depend on Beijing’s aid, then assessing

these nations’ commitments to loan repayments and continuation of friendly interactions, Beijing
was able to assess which of these nations had the potential to become the most reliable trade
partners. This method of “aid before trade” also allowed the Chinese to gain access to many of
these nations without any potentially harmful restraints in order to gauge each nation’s resources,
enabling them to ensure they invested in the right resource in the right country.
It is not difficult to see that China’s economic motivations on the African continent during
the 1960s are a reflection of the nation’s domestic economic conditions, as was the case with
China’s diplomatic motivations, and in contrast with China’s ideological motivations that clashed
with its domestic ideology. There is a general consensus among scholars that China’s foreign
policy in terms of economic interests was dependent on and a reflection of the nation’s domestic
economic conditions, supporting my sixth hypothesis as expressed in the introductory pages of
this paper.
China’s Current Economic Motivations in Africa
China’s economy did not truly start to develop until the 1980s. This shift in China’s focus
from primarily ideological and diplomatic issues to economic ones occurred gradually as a direct
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>
result of Deng Xiaoping’s opening-up reforms during that decade. In less than thirty years China
has raised itself out of its status as a “Third World” country and has emerged as a major
economic force to be reckoned with.

Deng’s brilliant approach to furthering his nation’s economic development did much
more than just increase the nation’s standard of living; it increased China’s international political
influence, prompting several African nations — South Africa in 1997, Central African Republic
and Guinea Bissau in 1998, Liberia in 2003, Senegal in 2005, Chad in 2006, and Malawi in 2008

(Yen, 2008, 1) — to switch their allegiance from Taipei to Beijing. In this sense, China’s
economic achievements furthered the country’s diplomatic interests. This contrasts sharply with
the situation during the 1960s, at which point China’s ideological and diplomatic efforts were
instrumental in maintaining the nation’s economy afloat. I therefore must disagree with Li

Anshan’s statement in his essay entitled China’s new Policy toward Africa when he argues that in
China, “[the] relation between diplomacy and economy was reversed, for example “economy
serving diplomacy” was changed to “diplomacy serving economy”” (Li, 2008, 22), and instead
insist upon the opposite statement that whereas during the 1960s, the strength of China’s
diplomacy was able to well serve the nation’s economy, now the trend has reversed, and the
strength of China’s economy is now able to serve the nation’s diplomatic endeavors, among other
things. Although Li Anshan recognizes economic interests to be the driving motivational force

behind China’s foreign policy in Africa, he argues that diplomacy exists to further economic
interests; this is not false, but I think that the economy’s role in shaping and strengthening current
diplomatic and ideological interests is much more important than emphasizing the ways by which
diplomacy and ideology serve economic interests. China’s current domestic economic conditions

Serve as a driving force to strengthen all aspects of China’s foreign policy, thereby strengthening

My opinion that focusing on the ways in which economy serves and shapes diplomacy and

4]

ideology is much more relevant than focusing on how diplomacy and other aspects of China’s
foreign policy serve economic interests because the latter can be answered in a single sentence:

diplomacy serves economy because economic interests have shaped diplomatic policies to do just
that.
An important aspect of China’s economy serving as a tool to further its diplomatic

interests is made evident by the agreement from several African nations to create Chineseinspired Special Economic Zones (SEZs). The recent approval for these SEZs came in 2006 as a
result of discussions at the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) summit that year
(Davies, 2008, 137).
According to Chinese Minister of Commerce Chen Deming, there has been significant
advancement towards realizing the goal of transposing China’s economic models into Africa
since those initial talks at the FOCAC summit in 2006; several of those projects are currently
under construction and are “progressing smoothly, including the Zambia-China Economic and
Trade Cooperation Zone, the Guangdong Economic and Trade Cooperation Zone in Nigeria and
the Lekky Duty Free Trade Zone in Lagos, Nigeria, the Egypt-Suez Economic and Trade Zone
and Ethiopian Orient Industrial Park” (Mu, 2009). Chen went on to boast about the recent
completion of the first of these zones, the Zambia-China Economic and Trade Cooperation Zone.
In his interview, he bragged about the grandeur of this project, stating that “Ten Chinese
enterprises with a combined investment of more than 700 million dollars have set up plants in the
zone located in the Zambian capital of Lusaka, offering some 3,500 jobs for local people” (Mu,

2009).
As mentioned in chapter 2, the creation of these SEZs throughout the African continent
and talks of creating more represent a significant ideological victory for China. It is fascinating
to observe that the United States, currently the world’s largest economic power, is still struggling
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to convince developing nations to implement its democratic and capitalist models for
development, sometimes resorting to armed intervention to achieve that goal, while on the other
hand, China’s pragmatic approach is proving more and more popular, and developing nations
across the world are starting to envision applying the Chinese model to their own economies.
Prior to establishing these SEZs, China had already established significant economic
influence in Africa by setting up state-owned enterprises throughout the continent in order to
secure a stable and constant influx of natural resources to support China’s increasing need for
imported materials, and “[t]here are now over 800 Chinese state-owned enterprises present in

Africa, mostly in the extractive industries” (Davies, 2008, 141). China’s expanding economic
influence in Africa is also providing it with many significant diplomatic advantages, most notably
in its long-standing diplomatic struggle with Taiwan. It is therefore likely that China’s economic
stronghold in Africa will be the culminating factor that causes the four remaining African nations
supportive of Taiwan’s independence to shift their loyalty to Beijing, bringing an end to the
sixty-year feud.
It is evident through China’s international status as a competitive actor on the
international market, as well as through the growing influence of China’s economic status on all
other aspects of China’s foreign policy, that economic interests have replaced diplomatic
motivations as the primary driving motivation for Chinese activity on the African continent. The
drastically different domestic conditions of China’s economy have served to reinforce a
broadening and change in direction of China’s diplomatic motivations from gaining international
recognition to strengthening that recognition; those conditions have contrarily reinforced the
direction for China’s ideologically pragmatic method of conducting its foreign policy. Economic
interests have clearly taken a leading role in determining China’s foreign policy’s plan of action,
supporting my eighth hypothesis as expressed in the opening introductory pages of this paper.
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The above statements also serve to support my ninth and final hypothesis, showing that
-

China

chan,

a%s economic motivations show both change and continuity when compared to the 1960s;

ge in terms of replacing diplomatic interests as the driving motivational force for China’s

foreign policy in Africa, as well as in terms of the breadth of China’s economic involvement
ore

the continent; and continuity in terms of those economic interests constantly being
throughout
0
on and a reflection of the nation’s domestic economic conditions.
dependent
e
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Chapter IV: China’s Oil Diplomacy
Throughout this paper I have for the most part treated the three motivational forces of
China’s foreign policy in Africa as three separate entities, but needless to say these three forces

are inextricably linked. To this extent, I have dedicated this final chapter to China’s oil
diplomacy in order to illustrate how diplomatic and ideological motivations work together to
serve the new driving force of China’s foreign policy: economic interests.
China’s rapid economic development has prompted the nation to become increasingly
dependent on importing resources to support its large population and fast-paced modernization.
China’s main raw material imports include “petroleum, timber, ferrochrome, cobalt, platinum,
copper, diamonds, and so on” (Rotberg, 2008, 1), the most important of which is petroleum.

Oil

has become a universally sought after material, and China is determined to secure itself a
significant portion of the world’s available supply.
In 1993, China became a net-importer of petroleum, and has since evolved to become the
world’s second-largest importer of this strategically crucial resource, representing 13% of the
world’s total demand for petroleum-related products (Rotberg, 2008, 4). The petroleum market
operates in a very volatile environment, made obvious by constant squabbles over prices,
allegiances, and tonnages. A recent and reoccurring example of this volatility is the quasi-yearly
“embargo” of Russian oil towards countries such as Ukraine, Poland, and Germany prompted by
disagreements over oil prices. Reliable allies are difficult to find, and it requires long-term
oriented mechanisms to acquire them. This is exactly what China has been doing.
Chinese involvement in Africa has always differed from that of other wealthy and
resource-hungry nations such as the United States and many European countries. China is no
exception when it comes to the search for natural resources, as made evident by the fact that SubSaharan African nations now account for 25% of China’s crude oil imports (Rotberg, 2008, 4-5),
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but while most nations are reluctant to create ties with African nations due to the widespread

political instability in the region, China has opted for a different path and once again claims the
ideologically neutral stance of “political non-interference in domestic affairs” in order to pursue
its economic interests wherever it sees fit. “Angola, Nigeria, Equatorial Guinea, Algeria, Sudan,
Gabon, Republic of Congo, Cameroon and Chad are just some of the African countries that

witnessed huge contracts for oil exploration, drilling, transportation and even refinery signed with
China” (Yen, 2008, 3).
Another appealing aspect of entertaining bilateral diplomatic relations with China is the

vast amount of aid provided by the PRC government. China’s tendency to provide grants,
interest-free loans, and low-interest loans to African nations dates back to the 1960s and suggests
that the Chinese government has long since considered the long-terms implications of its activity
in Africa. A new addition to China’s aid policy toward Africa is its “oil for aid” program
designed to incite oil-rich nations to invest with China in exchange for aid. However, the United
States believes that China’s “oil for aid” program, among other things, is simply a ploy to
increase China’s oil supply, implying that the “aid” part of the program is a sham, and does not
benefit its recipient nations (Krilla, 2005, 4). Even though I believe that China’s motives are
primarily selfish and economic in nature, I still believe that China’s aid program in constructed
with the intention of being beneficial to African nations. Considering Africa’s history of ousting
Soviet advisors when they failed to fulfill their promises, aid-oriented or otherwise, I find it hard
to believe that these African nations would accept to participate in such a program that they
themselves believed to be disadvantageous.

Even during the 1960s, when the only tools at

China’s disposal were a mixture of political and ideological jargon, along with limited amounts
of aid, China still implemented its promises for aid in a manner judged largely satisfactory by
most nations. Adding to that reputation for keeping its promises to Africa, — both diplomatic and
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economic promises — China’s newfound economic resources have completely changed the rules
of the game, and China is now able to use its capital to strive for maximum utility by using those
long-term connections it has built on the basis of mutual trust, mutual aid, and mutual non-

interference to create even stronger alliances, and secure resources for its ever-increasing
population.
Chinese is undeniably dependent on foreign oil, and judging by the high level of
importance held by that resource in China’s development, I am inclined to believe that China is
ready to make considerable concessions to maintain good relations with those nations that supply
it with that precious commodity, thereby adding to the necessity for ideological neutrality and
pragmatism, as well as a high level of diplomatic tact. I cannot think of many incentives for
China to deliberately skimp on providing appropriate amounts of aid in those nations who
voluntarily accept it. The consequences would far surpass the benefits in the long run, and
considering China’s ability to look at the long-run rather than the short run, if becomes even more
unlikely that China would try to swindle these nations in that manner.

Even if one attributes

exclusively selfish motives to China’s actions in Africa, it does not make sense for China to act in
a way that could eventually stunt its economic growth and gainsay its international political
influence.
Through examining China’s current oil diplomacy, one can easily observe that economic
factors provide the main reasons behind China’s diplomatic and pragmatic tactics. By fortifying
their diplomatic relations, and insisting upon a pragmatic approach rather than a dogmatic one in
terms of its foreign policy, China is able to ensure a stable foundation for achieving its economic
interests on the continent.
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Chapter V: Conclusions

China’s involvement in Africa during the 1960s, though primarily diplomatic and
ideological, has endured the test of time and prevailed in the early years of the twenty-first
century. The nature China’s relationships throughout the continent during those early years

provide for a stable base on which China has recently been able to build flourishing economic
relations with all but four African nations. Sino-African relations have managed to evolve in a

positive manner since the 1960s despite China’s various domestic issues, diplomatic issues with
Taiwan, ideological issues with the Soviet Union, and more recent issues with the developed
world over China’s methodology for economic development on the African continent.
Three main motivational forces characterize China’s relationship with Africa. The first,
China’s diplomatic motivations, have undergone fundamental changes since their beginnings in
the early 1960s, largely due to external factors such as China’s accession to the UN in 1971 and
to the WTO in 2001 as well as changes within the nation’s domestic economic conditions.
During the 1960s, China depended on African nations to gain international recognition for its
status as an independent nation and the only legitimate “China;” today, China’s diplomatic
endeavors have broadened, and China now depends on African support to sway decisions in the
UN’s General Assembly, and African nations now also depend on China’s support and status as
one of the permanent member of the UN Security Council to further its own interests too.
China’s ideological motivations represent the most controversial aspect of Chinese
activity on the African continent. While most specialists insist that there has been a change from
dogmatism to pragmatism, I have argued that the ideological motivations within China’s foreign
policy have always acted separately from its domestic ideology, continuously acting in a
pragmatic rather than dogmatic manner.

Indeed, ideological rhetoric has been noticeably absent

from China’s foreign policy, African or otherwise. Adopting a policy of non-interference in
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other countries’ affairs has actually provided a perfect platform for African nations to voluntarily
build long-term stable ties with China, and has benefited the recent increase in Sino-A frican
trade. China’s ideological motivations since the 1960s are therefore more characterized by

continuity in its pragmatic approach, and have not undergone any fundamental changes during
the past sixty years, reflecting the success of China’s ability to separate its domestic ideology
from its foreign policy.

The stability and strength of China’s economic ties on the African continent could not
have been achieved without China’s emphasis on adopting a long-term strategy. Had China not
spent the past sixty years strengthening its diplomatic relations or refraining from imposing its
ideological views on foreign nations, its African ties would probably be a lot weaker today.
Although the United States continues to denounce China’s methods and tendencies to support
unstable governments, other nations are starting to look at other parts of China’s policies, and
considering using them to further develop their own nations.
China has evolved from being an isolationist “non-nation” to being one of the world’s
most internationally influential diplomatic forces; it has adopted a pragmatic approach for its
foreign policy that continues to benefit the formation of new relations and the strengthening of
existing relations throughout the African continent; and it has evolved from having a poor,
peasant-based agrarian economy to acquiring the world’s second largest economy and nearing the
status of “world economic super power.” Fast-paced economic development has allowed for

economic interests to replace diplomatic motivations as the primary motivational force of China’s
foreign policy in Africa, and a stable continuous pragmatic approach has allowed China’s foreign
policy to maintain an element of stability that is reassuring to African nations.
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Implications for the Future
Some of the methods used by the Chinese government to propel itself onto the
international market where it now operates as a competitive player, as well as the fast pace at
which the Chinese economy continues to grow, have fostered strong reservations and fears from

Western democratic nations, most notably the United States. The United States’ most obvious
reason for expressing these concerns is based on the fear that African countries will abandon

plans to establish stable democracies in exchange for Communist-inspired Chinese models,
thereby threatening the democratic order the United States has been trying so hard to create.
Another one of the United States’ more implicit fears is economic-based: China’s economy has
been developing at a rapid pace of on average 9% a year for the past twenty years (CIA World
Factbook, 2008), and Americans are dreading the possibility that China and its non-democratic
government are going to surpass its own economically, altogether weakening America’s ability to
influence the overall direction of the world economy.
China’s willingness to overlook and sometimes, as is the case in the Sudan and Angola, to
support authoritarianism and dissident militia groups has been a strong factor for support among
African nations, who welcome China as a trade partner, aid benefactor, and sometimes arms
provider. However, this same willingness has also been an equally strong factor in creating
widespread feelings of contempt over China’s apparent lack of moral values and disregard for
human rights. Ever since Zhou Enlai put in motion his “Eight Principles” for foreign trade and
aid in 1964, the Chinese government has held its promise, at least to a degree deemed acceptable
by the concerned African nations, not to interfere in other nations’ domestic affairs. While
Western nations insist on including democracy-building and other such clauses in their bilateral
agreements with African nations, the Chinese do not, allowing these nations’ governments a
degree of political that they would not otherwise have when dealing with other, more

50

gemoc ratically-sound and morally-inclined nations.

“Since 2000, this [ attitude of laissez-faire on

she part of the Chinese government in regards to domestic A rican political activities] has
resulted ina 50 percent increase in Chinese trade with the [African] continent, reachin
g $18.5
pillion in 2003” (Krilla, 2005) and $50 billion at the end of 2007 (Rotberg, 2008, 3).
Such a

rapid increase in Sino-African trade is certainly going to incite fear in the United States, but it
does not necessarily imply that China’s methods are inherently flawed.

American and Western efforts on the African continent have not yet proven to be any
more effective than Chinese efforts in increasing living standards and economic prosperity.
Quite the contrary, it seems that Chinese efforts could provide for a viable alternative or
complement to some of the less effective methods used by Western state.

It is too soon to tell whether or not China’s policies will truly benefit African nations and
help them prosper, but perhaps China’s method of “development first, stability later” will prove
more effective than Western efforts to impose “stability first, development later.” Needless to
say I do not condone the various violations of human rights occurring throughout the African
continent, nor do I support their corrupt governments, but I do believe that increasing those
nations’ levels of economic development could bring a greater level of stability to those nations
in the future.
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